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1 Introduction
It is common in economics to assume that people know exactly how much a good is
worth to them (independently of the fact that they are willing to report this value in
a sincere way). However, this assumption is but an idealization: in general, people
assess the value of a good with a certain amount of imprecision. Specifically, they
tend to submit different willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA)
values, even in contexts where income effects are negligible (see Schmidt and Traub
(2009) for recent evidence, and Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007) for a dissenting view).
This valuation imprecision may be attributed to a certain amount of imprecision
in preferences themselves, which in turn may be interpreted as preference uncer-
tainty, in the standard sense where preferences are random in nature. Such an
interpretation, probably because it is amenable to a sound econometric treatment,
has been favored in the literature and studied quite extensively, showing that it in-
deed can explain much, if not all, of the WTP/WTA disparity (see Kingsley (2008)
for recent references).
However, preference uncertainty is not the only possible interpretation of pref-
erence imprecision. It can also be related to the imperfect ability of the human
perception apparatus to discriminate sounds, colors or smells, hence to distinguish
similar objects and express a preference between them as a result. The consequences
of this limitation in human perception were first studied by Luce in a famous article
(Luce 1956) where he introduced the concept of semiorder, generalized by Fishburn
with the notion of interval order (Fishburn 1970, p.18). Interval orders have the
property that (under suitable conditions in the general case), they can be repre-
sented by two functions u and v, with u ≤ v, in the sense that
x  y ⇐⇒ u(x) > v(y).
Each object x is therefore mapped to a “utility interval” [u(x), v(x)], i.e. has im-
precise utility. The interpretation of the functions u and v is not as transparent
as the interpretation of standard utility functions, however. In this note, we pro-
vide conditions for an interpretation for these functions as willingness-to-pay and
willingness-to-accept, and to the interval [u(x), v(x)] as the set of equivalent mon-
etary valuations for object x, thus bridging the gap between imprecise utility and
imprecise valuation in a formal and precise manner. We will introduce axioms that
imply that one possible interval utility representation is indeed the interval of values
defined by the willingness-to-pay and the willingness-to-accept.
Imprecise utility is indeed related in two natural ways to imprecise monetary
valuation. First, it is very likely that an imprecise utility valuation would trans-
late into an imprecise monetary one, as it would be surprising that someone who
cannot discriminate clearly between very similar objects would however be able to
give them a precise monetary value. Second, money itself is a dimension on which
discrimination is not always possible or easy. For instance, one would probably be
as willing to buy a given accommodation if its price were 300 000 euros as if it were
299 000 euros, since for an amount of this size a difference of 1000 euros is relatively
negligible.
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In the next section, we introduce the axioms. The results are presented in section
3 and applications in section 4. Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2 Axioms
Let A be a nonempty set and let X = A×R. The intended interpretation of a typical
element x = (a, w) of X is that it represents a particular endowment comprising a
certain number of non-monetary assets, a, on the one hand, and a certain amount
w of money1. Notice that this amount can be negative: debts are allowed. For any
x ∈ X and λ ∈ R, we denote x⊕ λ the element (a, w + λ).
We assume that there exists a family (r)r∈X of binary relations defined over
X. These binary relations model a profile of reference-dependent preferences, RDP
for short, that can be interpreted as modeling the observed choice behavior of the
individual in a context where his or her reference point is an element r of X. We
introduce the following axioms for observable preferences:
Axiom 1 (Strict Partial Order). For all r ∈ X, r is irreflexive and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Separability). For all x, y, r ∈ X, if x r y, then there exists λ > µ such
that
x	 λ r r and r ⊕ µ y y.
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity). For all r ∈ X, for all λ, µ ∈ R,
λ > µ =⇒ r ⊕ λ r r ⊕ µ.
Axiom 4 (Strict Buying Price Consistency). For all (x, r) ∈ X2, for all λ ∈ R,
x	 λ r r =⇒ x r r ⊕ λ.
Axiom 5 (Strict Monetary Status Quo Bias). For all (x, r) ∈ X2, for all λ ∈ R,
x⊕ λ r r =⇒ x⊕ λ x r.
In line with the literature on just noticeable differences, we assume that only
the strict part of preferences is transitive. That is the essential assumption made
in Strict Partial Order. It must be noted, in particular, that we do not make any
completeness assumption here. Strong Separability says that if I strictly prefer x to
y given endowment r, then there is always a price for which I would be willing to
pay for x and a lower price for which I would be willing to sell y. This means that
strict preference really means something in terms of price discrimination: if there
1All the results in this paper go through if we use as objects of choice any set X endowed with
an operation ⊕ : X × R −→ X such that:
(i) For all x ∈ X, x⊕ 0 = x;
(ii) For all λ, µ ∈ R, for all x ∈ X,
(x⊕ λ)⊕ µ = x⊕ (λ+ µ).
See Giraud (2009) for details.
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is strict preference, then even with imprecision in the evaluation of the objects at
hand, their value is sufficiently different for me to be able to choose one above the
other. The third axiom simply reflects the fact that more money is better than less.
Note however that it does not exclude that for some x ∈ X different from r, λ,
µ ∈ R, λ > µ and x⊕ µ r x⊕ λ. Only “pure” money, so to speak, is preferred to
less.
The idea of Strict Buying Price Consistency is that, if I am willing to pay λ
euros in order to buy x when my current endowment is r, then this means that the
subjective value of x relative to r is at least λ, i.e. I strictly prefer x to r even when
I receive in addition a windfall amount of λ euros.
The status quo bias is the general tendency to prefer sticking to the current
position, only because it is the current position. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)
provided convincing evidence for this tendency. Strict Monetary Status Quo Bias
conveniently expresses the idea that being the status quo gives an alternative an
extra power against other alternatives besides its intrinsic merit: when λ = 0, it
says that if an alternative x beats the status quo r, then a fortiori x must beat r
when x is the status quo, since it is thus even more attractive than before; this is
exactly the standard status quo bias. When λ > 0, then the fact that x beats r with
a premium of λ may imply that x is only weakly better than r. It does not imply
that x itself beats r when r is the status quo. Therefore, even being the status
quo it may not beat r. However, it must beat it with the premium λ. In other
words, other things being equal moving the status quo from r to x cannot worsen
x’s attractiveness. In turn, if λ < 0, then x worsened by the amount λ beats the
status quo r. There is thus a strong preference for x, so that when it is the status
quo x will still beat r when deprived of the amount λ.
This axiom is a consistency axiom that rules out a very direct form of preference
reversal: preferring x to y when y is the endowment and y to x when x is the endow-
ment. Since this kind of preference reversal makes the decision-maker vulnerable to
money pumps, ruling them out has been deemed necessary in the literature for a
modeling of rational reference-dependent preferences, and therefore similar axioms
(with λ = 0) have been introduced by many authors (Munro and Sugden 2002, Sagi
2006, Masatlioglu and Ok 2005, 2009, Apesteguia and Ballester 2009).
3 Results
Let us first define willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept in our framework.
The willingness-to-pay for x, given endowment r is given by the function:
b : X2 −→ R
(x, r) 7−→ supB(x, r) := {λ ∈ R | x	 λ r r}.
Similarly, the willingness-to-accept for x, given endowment r, relative to , is
given by the function:
s : X2 −→ R
(x, r) 7−→ inf S(x, r) := {λ ∈ R | r ⊕ λ x x}.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem:
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Theorem. {r}r∈X satisfies Strict Partial Order, Strong Separability, Monotonic-
ity, Strict Buying Price Consistency and Strict MSQB if and only if
(i) x r y ⇐⇒ b(x, r) > s(y, r);
(ii) b(x, r) ≤ s(x, r), for all x, r ∈ X;
(iii) b(r, r) = s(r, r) = 0 for all r ∈ X.
The representation found in the theorem for binary relation r shows that the
axioms imply that it be an interval order, even though none of these axioms (except
the first one) are standard axioms for interval orders. As we said above, interval
orders are generalizations of weak orders that are suitable to model imprecise (utility)
valuation of objects. The theorem allows to relate imprecise utility valuation to
imprecise monetary valuation. Indeed, define first the similarity relation ∼r by
x ∼r y ⇐⇒ ¬(x r y) and ¬(y r x).
This relation is called “indifference relation” by Fishburn (Fishburn 1970, p.12) and
he has a very broad interpretation of this concept, since it includes incomparabil-
ity. As a referee pointed out, however, including incomparability in the concept of
indifference might be confusing, and all the more so since Fishburn himself intro-
duces a companion relation that captures more faithfully the concept of indifference,
whereby two objects are indifferent if they are perfect substitutes in a preferential
judgment. He calls this relation the “equivalence” relation, and his resorting to this
very general term shows that there is a terminological problem. The definition of
this relation, that we shall call indifference relation and denote ≈r, is the following:
x ≈r y ⇐⇒ (∀z ∈ X, x ∼r z ⇐⇒ y ∼r z).
Note that x ≈r y only if x ∼r y, so that indifference implies similarity but not the
other way around. Moreover, although transitivity might be considered a defining
property of indifference2, it is not required of similarity in the literature (see e.g.
Tversky 1977, Rubinstein 2000).
Then we have the following corollary (the simple proof of which is omitted).
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of the theorem, for all λ ∈ R,
b(x, r) ≤ λ ≤ s(x, r) ⇐⇒ x ∼r r ⊕ λ.
In other words, any monetary value between the WTP and the WTA can be
considered as the monetary value of the object assessed, as far as the decision maker
is concerned. Notice that since the similarity relation of an interval order is not
necessarily transitive, we cannot conclude from this that b(x, r) = s(x, r), thus
maintaining the possibility of the WTA/WTP discrepancy.
2However Luce (Luce 1956) insisted on the possibility of intransitive indifference, but in this
paper indifference is defined as in Fishburn (1970), so the same terminological criticism applies.
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For the sake of completeness, we show how a larger willingness-to-pay and a
larger willingness-to-accept can be characterized in terms of preference only. Define
two new binary relations br and sr by:
x br y ⇐⇒ ∃z ∈ X, x r z, z ∼r y,
and
x sr y ⇐⇒ ∃z ∈ X, x ∼r z, z r y.
These binary relations can be seen as approximations of the true preference
relation: x is approximately preferred to y in the sense of br if it is preferred to an
object similar to y; likewise, x is approximately preferred to y in the sense of sr if
there exists an object similar to x that is preferred to y. Then:
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of the theorem,
x br y ⇐⇒ b(x, r) > b(y, r)
and
x sr y ⇐⇒ s(x, r) > s(y, r).
Moreover,
x ≈r y ⇐⇒ b(x, r) = b(y, r) and s(x, r) = s(y, r).
4 Applications
4.1 Preference for Liquidity
Consider the following definition of comparative preference for liquidity:
Definition 1. Let (1r)r∈X and (2r)r∈X be the observable preference profiles of two
individuals and r, r′ ∈ X. Then 1 has a stronger preference for liquidity at r than 2
at r′ if, for all x ∈ X such that S1(x, r) = S2(x, r′) and x 1r r and for all w ≥ 0:
x 1r r ⊕ w =⇒ x 2r′ r′ ⊕ w
The intuition is that person 1 with endowment r has a stronger preference for
liquidity than person 2 with endowment r′ if, given any object x for which they
both have the same willingness-to-accept and given any positive amount of money
w, whenever person 1 prefers having x to having w, then so does person 2. The
requirement that the two decision makers have the same WTA is made to guarantee
that the comparison of preference for liquidity is made all things being equal, i.e.
controlling for possible divergence in attitudes with respect to the object being
evaluated.
Now, it is possible to characterize the preference for liquidity in the context of
the theorem, as shown by the next proposition:
Proposition 1. Assume (1r)r∈X and (2r)r∈X satisfy Strict Partial Order, Strong
Separability, Monotonicity, Strict Buying Price Consistency and Strict MSQB. Then,
the following are equivalent:
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(i) 1 has a stronger preference for liquidity at r than 2 at r′.
(ii) For all x ∈ X such that s1(x, r) = s2(x, r′) and x 1r r , [b2(x, r), s2(x, r′)] ⊆
[b1(x, r), s1(x, r′)].
In words, this proposition says that if agent 1 has greater preference for liquidity
than 2, his or her buying price for a given item will systematically be lower than
agent 2’s buying price. This is intuitive since, if I buy a good, I lose the advantages
of liquidity. The higher these advantages for me, the less will my willingness to
abandon them be, and therefore the less my willingness-to-pay for the object since
it includes the cost of abandoning them. Moreover, this proposition establishes a
connection between preference for liquidity and the size of the WTA/WTP gap: the
higher the preference for liquidity, the larger the gap. This seems intuitive if one
accepts the idea that WTP incorporates illiquidity costs, and therefore the higher
it is, the wider the gap.
4.2 The Strength of the Status Quo Bias
The status quo bias is the fact that the decision maker has a tendency to stick to the
status quo. However, there is no reason for this bias to be of equal strength whatever
the status quo. To model this fact, we introduced in Giraud (2006) a comparative
definition of the strength of this status quo
Definition 2. r is a stronger status quo than r′ (denoted r <SQB r′) if:
∀x ∈ X, x r r ⇒ x r′ r′.
The strength of the status quo bias can be characterized in the context of the
theorem:
Proposition 2. Assume that (r)r∈X satisfies Strict Partial Order, Strong Separa-
bility, Monotonicity, Strict Buying Price Consistency and Strict MSQB. Then,
r <SQB r′ ⇐⇒ b(x, r) ≤ b(x, r′), ∀x ∈ X.
Hence r is a stronger status quo than r′ if the decision maker is never willing to
pay more for a given object x when he or she must forego r than when he or she
must forego r′.
A Proofs
Proof of the Theorem. Sufficiency of the axioms Assume x r y. Then, by
Strong Separability, there exists λ > µ such that
x	 λ r r and r ⊕ µ y y.
This implies, on the one hand, that b(x, r) ≥ λ and, on the other hand, that
µ ≥ s(y, r). But, since λ > µ, this implies that b(x, r) > s(y, r).
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Now, assume that b(x, r) > s(y, r). Then, since b(x, r) is the supremum of
the set B(x, r) = {λ ∈ R | x 	 λ r r}, there exists λ ∈ B(x, r) such that
b(x, r) ≥ λ > s(y, r). By a similar reasoning, there exists µ ∈ R such that
r ⊕ µ y y and λ > µ ≥ s(y, r). By Strict Buying Price Consistency, we have
that x r r ⊕ λ and by Strict MSQB, we have that r ⊕ µ r y. Therefore,
since λ > µ, Monotonicity and Strict Partial Order imply that x r y.
Irreflexivity of r for all r implies that for all x ∈ X, not b(x, r) > s(x, r), and
therefore b(x, r) ≤ s(x, r).
Monotonicity and Irreflexivity imply that
B(r, r) = (−∞, 0),
so that its supremum b(r, r) is 0. For the same reason,
S(r, r) = (0,+∞),
so that its infimum s(r, r) equals 0.
Necessity of the axioms
Strict Partial Order Irreflexivity follows from (ii). For transitivity, take
x, y, z, r ∈ X such that x r y and y r z. Then, b(x, r) > s(y, r) and
b(y, r) > s(z, r). Since b(y, r) ≤ s(y, r), we have that b(x, r) > s(z, r).
Strong Separability If x r y, then b(x, r) > s(y, r), so we can repeat the
argument given in the sufficiency part.
Monotonicity Let λ > µ. Then, for all r ∈ X, b(r⊕λ, r)−s(r⊕µ, r) = b(r⊕
λ, r)−s(r⊕µ, (r⊕µ)	µ) = λ−µ > 0 because b(r, r) = s(r⊕µ, r⊕µ) = 0.
Therefore r ⊕ λ r r ⊕ µ.
Strict Buying Price Consistency Let x, r ∈ X and λ ∈ R be such that
x 	 λ r r. Then, b(x 	 λ, r) > s(r, r) = 0. Therefore, b(x, r) > λ =
s(r ⊕ λ, r), hence x r r ⊕ λ.
Strict MSQB Let x, r ∈ X and λ ∈ R be such that x⊕ λ r r.
Then b(x, r) + λ > 0, therefore −b(x, r)− λ < 0, i.e.
s(r, x) < λ = b(x⊕ λ, x), hence x⊕ λ x r.
Proof of Corollary 2. We prove the first result, the second is proved similarly.
Assume first x br y. Then there exists z ∈ X such that x r z, and therefore
b(x, r) > s(z, r), and such that z ∼r y, so that ¬(y r z), i.e. b(y, r) ≤ s(z, r).
Combining both yields b(x, r) > b(y, r).
Assume now b(x, r) > b(y, r). Then, there exists λ ∈ R such that x	λ r r and
b(x, r) ≥ λ > b(y, r). By Strict Buying Price Consistency, this implies x r r ⊕ λ,
and therefore, by Monotonicity and transitivity, x r r ⊕ b(y, r). But, by the
preceding corollary, we have y ∼r r ⊕ b(y, r). Therefore, x br y.
The final result follows from Fishburn (1970, Theorem 2.6).
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Proof of Proposition 1. (i)⇒ (ii) Let x such that S1(x, r) = S2(x, r′) and x 1r
r and let λ ∈ [b2(x, r′), s2(x, r′)]. Since x 1r r and 1 has higher preference for
liquidity than 2, it follows that x 2r′ r′, and therefore b2(x, r′) > 0, hence
λ > 0. Now, x ∼2r′ r′ ⊕ λ, which implies ¬(x 2r′ r′ ⊕ λ). Again, since 1
has higher preference for liquidity than 2, this implies ¬(x 1r r ⊕ λ), hence
b1(x, r) ≤ λ ≤ s2(x, r′). Moreover, since S1(x, r) = S2(x, r′), they have the
same infimum, so that s1(x, r) = s2(x, r′), hence b1(x, r) ≤ λ ≤ s1(x, r).
(ii)⇒ (i) Straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume first that r <SQB r′ and take x ∈ X and λ ∈ R
such that x	 λ r r. Then, by definition of <SQB, we have x	 λ r′ r′. Therefore
B(x, r) ⊆ B(x, r′), and hence b(x, r) ≤ b(x, r′).
Conversely, assume b(x, r) ≤ b(x, r′) and assume x r r. Then b(x, r) > 0, and
therefore b(x, r′) > 0, implying x r′ r′.
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